Increasing evidence from the empirical economic and psychological literature suggests that positive and negative well-being are more than opposite ends of the same phenomenon. Two separate measures of the dependent variable may therefore be needed when analyzing the determinants of subjective well-being. We investigate asymmetries in the effect of income on subjective well-being with a single-item measure of general life satisfaction. Using data from the German Socio- Economic Keywords: generalized ordered probit model, marginal probability effects, random and fixed effects, life-satisfaction.
1 understanding of the mechanism underlying the GLS responses, but also add another explanation to why the overall effect is rather small although income may have a substantial effect for part of the population. Any evaluation of the well-being consequences of economic policies would need to account for such asymmetries.
We should briefly explain what we mean by "response asymmetries". In the traditional interpretation of the single item GLS scale, satisfaction is just the absence of dissatisfaction. In this view, the effect of income on satisfaction is equal to minus the effect of income on dissatisfaction.
We avoid such a cardinal interpretation and rather focus on the ordering. For simplicity, consider the case where the GLS scale has only three categories: "satisfied", "neutral" and "dissatisfied". 1
The model we consider does not impose a priori that factors increasing the probability of satisfaction must also reduce the probability of dissatisfaction, and vice versa. This is new, as far as we can tell, although there have been a number of related approaches. Huppert and Whittington (2003) use the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-30) to identify positive items. The score on these positive items is then labeled "positive well-being", whereas a standard symptom measure of psychological distress, also from the GHQ-30, is used for "negative well-being". Similarly, Headey and Wooden (2004) compare well-being from a GLS question (as used in our paper) with ill-being obtained from a five-item scale on mental health (i.e., capturing anxiety, depression, and the like). These studies therefore do not investigate differences in the effects of a variable, such as income, at different poles of the same scale. Our approach also differs from the large literature on positive and negative affect, spurred by Bradburn (1969) , since we focus on global life satisfaction, a person's conscious evaluative judgment of life, rather than affect.
With data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984-2004, we find that income significantly reduces the incidence of low satisfaction but it does not increase the incidence of high satisfaction in a subsample of men living in one-person households. This finding corroborates previous evidence of asymmetric effects from multi-item analyses of subjective well-being, this time with a singleitem measure of general life satisfaction.
For economists, empirical evidence on the relationship between income and subjective well-being (SWB) is important for (at least) two reasons. First, the design and evaluation of economic policies often takes income as the target quantity of interest. The idea is, of course, that income is a good proxy for well-being, and that it is easy to measure. If the link between income and well-being is less strong than suspected, then economic policies based on income (or GDP) maximization alone may turn out to be inferior from an overall well-being perspective. Second, the relationship between income and well-being may be used to put a monetary value -or shadow price -on non-traded goods, usually in the context of cost-benefit analyses. The basic idea is one of compensation: in case of a "bad", how much of an increase in income is required to offset the negative effect of the bad, while keeping the person at the same level of SWB as in the absence of the bad? Similarly, in case of a good, one can implicitly determine the shadow price by asking how much income a person would be willing to give up in order to obtain the good, keeping SWB fixed.
Examples for this line of research are Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , who estimate the pecuniary value of a lasting marriage (relative to widowhood) to be $100,000 per year. Other examples include Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who estimate the money-equivalent value of the psychological cost of unemployment, a trade-off that we will come back to below, and Schwarze (2003) who uses the principle to determine an income equivalence scale, i.e., the income compensation required to keep the same level of an individual's well-being with one additional household member present. Frey et al. (2004) estimate the value of public safety, or the absence of terrorism. Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) measure the external cost of air traffic noise for people living near the Amsterdam Airport.
Unfortunately, the implied compensation may be sensitive to the chosen model, and too restrictive assumptions may lead to spurious estimates. An obvious concern is that the same income change has a different meaning for poor than for rich people. This concern resonates throughout the literature. Typically, it is found that the correlation between income and subjective well-being is much stronger among the poor. While the absence of poverty does not guarantee happiness, the presence often prevents it (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002) . Such non-linearities can be addressed, for instance, by studying the correlation between GLS and logarithmic income. In this case, a proportionate effect is assumed: To achieve the same increase in satisfaction, larger and larger absolute changes in income are necessary. Semi-parametric estimators have provided some support for a log-linear functional form.
The topic of our paper is different. Not all poor people are dissatisfied with their lives, nor are all wealthy people satisfied. The general life satisfaction scale integrates the subjects' reflected valuation of various domains of their lives, weighting them in whatever way they choose (van Praag et al. 2003) . In the broadest sense, one can distinguish two domains, a pecuniary domain and a non-pecuniary domain (that includes, perhaps most importantly, health and social relationships).
Our working hypothesis is that the non-pecuniary domain moderates the effect of the pecuniary domain on GLS. Specifically, if the valuation of the non-pecuniary domain contributes to a low GLS, then the effect of the pecuniary domain becomes stronger, i.e., an income increase will have a more favorable effect on GLS, compared to the case where the non-pecuniary domain leads to a high GLS score. Such a framework will lead to the aforementioned response asymmetries: income will lower dissatisfaction more than it will increase satisfaction.
To test this hypothesis, we cannot use conventional regression or ordered response models, because in these models the effect of income at various satisfaction levels cannot be estimated freely but rather is dictated by functional form, essentially a single parameter. A naive approach would be to split the scale, for example by defining the outcomes "dissatisfied" for scores below an arbitrary cut-off, and "satisfied" for values above an arbitrary cut-off, and analyzing their response patterns separately. Slightly more sophisticated approaches can be based either on a latent class framework, or on generalized ordered probit models as proposed here.
In latent class models, one can define any number of latent groups and estimate the effect of income conditional on group membership. A recent example for such an approach is the study by Clark et al. (2005) who used GLS data from the European Community Household Panel. They found that the effect of income changes were larger in the "latent satisfied" than in the "latent dissatisfied" classes. Here we address the issue from a different angle: Rather than inferring 4 response asymmetries from unobservable class membership, we model them directly using an alternative approach with outcome-specific parameters, a generalized ordered probit model for panel data. The technical details of the model are discussed in the next section.
Econometric Modeling
Most empirical work on the determinants of subjective well-being uses either linear regression or single-index ordered probit and logit models. While the latter account for the discreteness and ordering of the dependent variable, they impose an implicit cardinalization such that, for example, the trade-off ratios between income and other determinants of well-being must be constant across the distribution of outcomes ). Since we want to estimate unrestricted income effects for low and high levels of well-being, we need to use more flexible models, and the multinomial logit with its multi-index structure is certainly one option. However, this model does not make any use of the ordering information and therefore cannot be efficient. We propose a generalization of Maddala's (1983) and Terza's (1985) model to panel data instead that is comparably flexible as the multinomial logit and in addition accounts for the ordinality.
Model and Assumptions
Let Y it ∈ {1, . . . , J} denote the survey response to the GLS question of individual i = 1, . . . , n at time t = 1, . . . , T i , and let X it denote the vector of covariates (including logarithmic income).
The relationship between Y it and X it is specified in terms of cumulative conditional probabilities:
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution, and θ y denotes a vector of category-specific parameters, including a constant. 2 The function Φ(·) maps the linear index onto the unit interval, and we require θ = (θ 1 . . . θ J−1 ) to fulfill the strict inequalities 
We assume that X it is strictly exogenous conditional on η i and that outcomes are independent conditional on (X i , η i ), where X i contains X it for all t. The first assumption rules out lagged dependent variables in X it , the second assumption allows for dependencies in Y it across t if conditioned only on X i . Note that the independence assumption restricts the covariance matrix of individual effects to be diagonal, i.e., Cov(η i , η i ) = 0 ∀i = i .
Without specifying the relationship between X it and η i , i.e., treating η i as fixed parameters to be estimated along with θ, a model based on (2) will suffer from the incidental parameters problem. For fixed time and large cross-sectional dimension, the number of parameters η i is unbounded, with available information on η i being fixed, which in general yields inconsistent estimators of η i and θ. We solve this problem by treating η i as random variable drawn along with (X i , Y i ) and following the idea of Chamberlain (1980 ) under a Mundlak (1978 restriction to allow for possible correlation between η i and X i :
whereX i is the vector of averages of X it over time, γ is a conformable parameter vector, and
The distributional assumption and the independence ensure that the correlation matrix of the random effects is the identity matrix. If we replace η i in (2) by (3), then we obtain
or in terms of a conditional probability model for all y = 1, . . . , J
where it is understood that Φ(−X it θ 0 −X i γ − α i ) = 0 and Φ(−X it θ J −X i γ − α i ) = 1 due to identification and adding up to one. 4 The joint distribution of (Y i1 , . . . , Y iT i ) conditional on observables is obtained by integrating out α i in the probabilities (5),
with indicator function 1(·), and y it , x it ,x i denote sample realizations of Y it , X it ,X i . The inner product over all J categories selects the appropriate likelihood contribution for each observation (individual i at time t) according to the observed category, and the independence of Y it conditional on (X i , α i ) ensures that the joint probability of (Y i1 , . . . , Y iJ )|(X i , α i ) can be written as the product of single probabilities over T i . The integral in (6) does not have a closed form solution, but it can be rewritten in a form amenable to Gauss-Hermite quadrature for numerical approximation.
Estimation of parameters by maximum likelihood is straightforward once the integral has been evaluated, and the resulting estimator is consistent, efficient, and approximately normally distributed. The generalized ordered probit model with random effects specification has been implemented in a new Stata module called regoprob available via the ssc commands in Stata. 5
Type net search regoprob or ssc install regoprob in the command line of Stata to find out more about regoprob. See also the documentation of regoprob for details on the command syntax and the output generated by Stata.
Interpretation of the Model
There are a number of ways to interpret the estimated parameters, but we focus here on two quantities that offer a very intuitive interpretation when dealing with conditional probability models. First, we may ask the question "How does a ceteris paribus change in income affect the distribution of GLS responses?" which can be answered by marginal probability effects (MPE's).
Such effects are of particular interest for the asymmetry hypothesis since we are able to identify whether income effects on GLS differ for low and high GLS. Second, we may look at asymmetric effects from a different (probability) angle insofar as we do not investigate the change in the GLS distribution at different poles, but instead we keep the GLS distribution fixed and analyze income changes required to compensate for a change in another covariate, thereby distinguishing between trade-offs for low and and high GLS.
MPE's can be obtained by taking first derivatives of (5) with respect to the variable(s) of interest. Since α i is an unobserved random variable, we cannot directly calculate the MPE's without further assumptions. One possibility would be to take advantage of the probit form and the normality of α i and rewrite the conditional probabilities marginal on α i as
where ϑ y = θ y (1 + σ 2 α ) −1/2 and ψ = γ(1 + σ 2 α ) −1/2 denote the population-averaged coefficient vectors. The coefficients are called population-averaged since they are obtained as the expectation of (5) over α i . Taking derivatives of (7) yields
where φ(·) denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution, and X
it denotes the l-th element in X it (here assumed to be logarithmic income) and ϑ
y the corresponding scaled (income) coefficient. The MPE's are functions of the covariates and therefore depend on the values of X it andX i . We estimate the MPE's replacing the unknown coefficients by the maximum likelihood estimates and evaluating at the sample averages of the regressors.
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The second quantity of interest, the trade-off ratio, assesses the importance of income relative to other determinants. It follows from totally differentiating (7) that
where
denotes any other covariate in X it , and the MPE's are given by (8). The approximation in (9) directly leads to the concept of compensating variation:
How much of a variation in one regressor (here income) is needed to offset the given change in another regressor such that dP (Y it = y|X it ,X i ; ϑ, ψ) = 0 ∀y, i.e., all probabilities remain unchanged. Rearranging terms yields
In the standard model, this trade-off ratio reduces to the ratio of coefficients, i.e., we obtain
, which does not vary across outcomes, whereas in the generalized model such an restriction is not imposed. Rather, we can let the data speak and determine empirically how these trade-off ratios look like.
Data
The In addition, we employ a novel restriction by considering single person households only. The rationale for this selection is that the match between reported household income and individual material well-being is much better in single-person households than we could possibly hope for in a multi-person household. General household surveys such as the GSOEP typically include two types of income measures, one being total household income (from all sources), the other being personal labor earnings. Clearly, personal labor earnings are not a very good indicator of material well-being, in particular, but not only, for persons who do not work, as it does not include any government transfers (e.g., child benefit, government grants, or rent subsidies). Household income (net of taxes and social security contributions) is in general a more appropriate measure.
However, in multi-person households, there remain two types of ambiguities. First, there is an ongoing debate on the right equivalence scale in order to reflect economies of scale in household production and consumption. Secondly, we do not know whether resources are shared evenly within the household, but such an (arbitrary) assumption is required when assigning one income to several household members.
For these reasons, we find it instructive to study the relationship between income and SWB in the (reference) population of single person households. We do not claim that such a sample is and are on average more than five years younger. The unemployment rate is about 2.5 percentage points higher for men than for women, and 58.2 percent of the women are relatively satisfied with their health status (compared to 65.6 percent of the men). These variations can largely be explained by the different age distributions of single male and single female households. Men are mostly living alone when they are young and at the beginning of their career path. Women are more likely to live alone when they are older, contributing factors being a higher incidence of widowhood due to greater life-expectancy.
-Insert Table 1 about hereTable 2 cross-tabulates the sample means of the dependent variable conditional on the GLS response, again separately for men and women. The income variable shows a lot of variation along the GLS dimension. For men (panel A), the lowest average monthly income (1124 Euro) is observed for individuals with very low GLS, the highest income (1519 Euro) for those with response "8". When moving from the utmost left part of the GLS distribution to the right, 11 average income is first increasing then decreasing. A similar pattern can be observed for women (panel B), although on a lower level. Concerning unemployment and health, we find that among less satisfied people the unemployment rate is relatively high and that reported health status and GLS are positively correlated.
-Insert Table 2 about here -
Estimation Results
In this section, we report on the estimation results of the relationship between income and subjective well-being, the latter measured by general life satisfaction. We first present the estimated income parameters under several model assumptions, then turn our attention to the implications with respect to the asymmetry hypothesis, and finally discuss the robustness of our results.
We estimated two different models: A random effects ordered probit model (OProbit) including group means as additional regressors, and a generalized random effects ordered probit model (GOProbit), also including group means, where all parameters are outcome-specific. In both cases, the pooled models were clearly rejected against the panel models, which is reflected in Table 3 where we report the estimated variances (and standard errors) of the random effects, σ 2 α , separately for men and women. Furthermore, a joint significance test of the group means as additional regressors rejected the null hypothesis of zero correlation, and thus a simple random effects specification withoutX i is rejected by the data.
-Insert Table 3 about here -
In our analysis, we will not only examine the relationship between income and GLS, but we will also consider the interaction with unemployment in order to evaluate the relative impact of income. Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients on logarithmic income and unemployment separately for men (panel A) and women (panel B). Although the raw parameters are not very interesting per se, the comparison may be useful for understanding our later results. For men, we find a positive and significant income parameter in the standard model (0.362 with z-value 6.67). In the generalized model, eight different parameters are estimated. The income coefficients are slightly higher for the parameter vectors θ 1 to θ 6 than the overall estimate in the standard model. The point estimate decreases but is still significant for θ 7 , and finally turns negative and insignificant for θ 8 . The estimated coefficients in the sample of women are smaller (in absolute value) and less significant than those for men indicating a weaker relative impact. For example, in the standard model we obtain an income point estimate of 0.131, which is only about a third of that for men, and the z-value decreases to 1.97. In the generalized model the income coefficients are significant on the 5%-level only for θ 4 and θ 5 , while all other income coefficients are insignificant.
For the unemployment coefficient in the subsample of men we obtain point estimates for low/high satisfaction that are smaller/higher (in absolute terms) than the overall estimate in the standard model, for women we observe the opposite pattern.
-Insert Table 4 about hereIf we formally test the generalized ordered probit model against the standard model, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal slope parameters for men (LR 203 = 548.9) and for women (LR 203 = 430.1). The null hypothesis of equal income coefficients is also rejected for both, men and women, equal unemployment coefficients is only rejected for women.
In order to interpret the estimated parameters and evaluate the effects of income on low and high GLS we now turn the quantities introduced in Section 3. Consider the marginal probabilities first. Table 5 , Figures 2 and 3 summarize the MPE's of income and unemployment by gender.
Consider, for example, the results for men and take the ceteris paribus effect of an increase in logarithmic household income by a small amount on the probability of responding a GLS level of "8" (equal interpretation applies to the effects at all other GLS levels). Table 5 shows a value of 0.059 for the standard model. This means that the probability of a response of "8" increases by 0.059 percentage points if we increase logarithmic income by 0.01, which corresponds approximately to a one-percent increase in level income. A doubling of income, i.e., a change in logarithmic income by 0.693, increases the probability of response "8" by about 0.059×0.693×100, or about 4.09 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
Comparing the MPE's among the standard and the generalized models and over all possible outcomes, we obtain the following pattern. For men all models suggest that more income significantly reduces the probability of low GLS (0-5), and significantly increases the probability of response "8". For high GLS responses (9-10), the standard model predicts a significant positive effect, whereas the generalized model does not predict an effect significantly different from zero.
Thus, based on the generalized ordered probit model, there is no evidence for income to have an effect on high satisfaction. Moreover, the effect of income is asymmetric: higher income decreases the probability of dissatisfaction, but it does not affect the probability of high satisfaction. Figure   2 illustrates the asymmetric effects and shows the differences between the MPE's in the standard ordererd probit model and the generalized ordered probit model.
For women the relationship between income and GLS is relatively weak. While the standard model finds small but significant effects for low and high GLS, the generalized model predicts a significant negative effect only for responses "5" and "6". Concerning unemployment, we find evidence for men that an increased unemployment probability reduces the probability of response "8", or higher, and increases the probability of low responses, but the relationship for women is less clear. For example, an increase in the probability of being unemployed by one percentage point reduces the probability of response "8" by about 0.096 percentage points for men, and raises the probability of the same outcome by about 0.051 percentage points for women. The gender difference might be explained by social norms that assign the role of primary income earner to men and therefore make income a relatively more important determinant of male well-being (e.g., Lalive and Stutzer 2004) . Such a gender difference can also be observed when considering unemployment.
The relationship between GLS, income, and unemployment, for men and women, at various parts of the GLS distribution can alternatively be illustrated by the trade-off ratios. Table 6, Figures 4 and 5 show the required changes in logarithmic income if the unemployment probability increases by one percentage point, given the GLS distribution is fixed. If we want to interpret the reported numbers, we need to be careful with respect to the significance of MPE's. The trade-off ratio does only make sense for significant income effects. In this case, the required change in income is either zero if the MPE of unemployment is statistically not different from zero, or the change is positive (or negative) for significant unemployment effects. We marked the four cases (non-sensible/zero/positive/negative) with ×/ • / + /−.
-Insert Table 6 , Figures 4 and 5 about here -
The numbers in Table 6 (multiplied by 100) approximate the percentage change in income, e.g., for men in the standard model a 0.019 means that income must increase by 1.9 percent to offset the increase in the unemployment probability by one percentage point. As expected, the trade-off ratios in the ordered probit model are constant for all levels of GLS, and interpretation therefore is not particularly interesting. In the generalized model, required income changes vary between 0.6 and 4.2 percent. An important observation is that income compensations are entirely ineffective for men with high GLS, and effective for medium to low satisfied men, though in a very heterogeneous way. For women, a compensation for unemployment in terms of income is rather unpromising, and other factors determining GLS need to be identified when looking for effective compensation schemes. Figures 4 and 5 provide a graphical illustration of the results.
While these results are obtained for a specific sample and a specific parametric model with its set of assumptions, we found a remarkable robustness of the main conclusions with respect to alternative specifications and samples. Possible alternatives include the use of different link functions (rather than the probit ones), including the logit, the log-logistic, and the complementary log-log; we estimated a series of binary models, where the dependent variables result from dichotomization of GLS responses, i.e., Y it > 2 against Y it ≤ 2, Y it > 3 against Y it ≤ 3, and so on; conditioning on fixed effects using Chamberlain's (1982) conditional logit model; the use of multi-person household samples; and possible endogeneity of income in the GLS equation. We could not find evidence for endogeneity. Neither provided alternative link functions a better fit, nor did the response asymmetry for men disappear in multi-person households or with the full set of responses.
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The distinction between positive and negative well-being has been made for some time now. Huppert and Whittington (2003) point out that the determinants of positive and negative wellbeing are not necessarily the same. For example, in their study of participants in the British
Health and Lifestyle Survey, paid employment was found to be an important determinant of positive well-being but to have less influence on psychological symptoms. Headey and Wooden (2004) use also two separate measures of well-being and ill-being. In their case, the pecuniary situation, captured through income and wealth, was found to affect both aspects equally.
Our paper takes a different approach. We also study the determinants of well-being, in partic- Clearly, more research is needed in this area. We think that our methodological focus on flexible estimation of marginal probability effects and trade-off ratios with a single measure of well-being, namely general life satisfaction, should prove useful in further investigations. If one wants to estimate marginal probability effects and compensating variations in a meaningful way, then one should use the generalized ordered probit model rather than the simpler models prevailing in earlier research. Notes: The models are the ordered probit (OProbit) and the generalized ordered probit (GOProbit). Each model controls for a quadratic form in age, good health (0/1), and time fixed effects. Individual effects are assumed to be decomposable into a linear function of individual group means and orthogonal error, and the likelihood for each individual is approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Table 4 . The marginal probability effects have been calculated for logarithmic income and unemployment, evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables and marginal on the individual effect. An increase in income by one percent corresponds to an increase in logarithmic income by 0.01, i.e., reported numbers can be interpreted directly as percentage point changes. Similarly, if changes in the unemployment probability by 0.01 are considered, then the reported numbers directly give percentage point changes. Approximate standard errors (delta method) in parentheses. Table 4 . The trade-off ratios show the required change in logarithmic income to compensate for an increase in the unemployment probability by one percentage point, fixing the probability of a GLS response. The ratio of significant (at the 10% level) marginal income and unemployment effects is marked +/− (if positive/negative). If the marginal income effect is insignificant, the ratio is marked ×. If the income effect is significant but the unemployment effect is not, the ratio is marked •. Approximate standard errors (delta method) in parentheses.
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